A big challenge in continuous variable quantum key distribution is to prove security against arbitrary coherent attacks including realistic assumptions such as finite-size effects. Recently, such a proof has been presented in [Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 100502 (2012)] for a two-mode squeezed state protocol based on a novel uncertainty relation with quantum memories. But the transmission distances were fairly limited due to a direct reconciliation protocol. We prove here security against coherent attacks of a reverse reconciliation protocol under similar assumptions but allowing distances of over 16 km for experimentally feasible parameters. We further clarify the limitations when using the uncertainty relation with quantum memories in security proofs of continuous variable quantum key distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
The most advanced quantum information technology is quantum key distribution (QKD), which is the art of using quantum properties to distribute a secure key between two remote parties. Its challenge lies in the combination of state of the art experimental implementations and newly developed quantum information theoretic principles to ensure its security. There exist two different implementations both of which have different benefits. More established is the encoding of the information in a quantum system with discrete degrees of freedoms, as, e.g., the polarization of a photon. Such discrete variable protocols are usually based on single photon sources and detectors with the latter suffer from low efficiency at room temperature and being susceptible to loopholes (see, e.g., [1, 2] ). The advantage of such protocols is that conditioned on the arrival of a single photon, the channel noise is generally weaker allowing for long distances.
An alternative implementation encodes the information into the quadratures of the electromagnetic field (see the recent review [3] and references therein). Since the quadratures have a continuous spectrum they are called continuous variable QKD protocols. Compared to discrete variable protocols, they are based on variants of homodyne detection which is a robust and efficient measurement technique already used in current telecommunication systems. Although CV QKD systems are secure against blinding attacks, they are particularly vulnerable to manipulations of the phase reference signal (local oscillater) (see, e.g., [4, 5] ). Since the information is directly encoded in the phase and amplitude of the laser beam, the fiber losses severely damp the transmitted signal and with that the encoded information. Nevertheless, it was shown in [6] that a key can be generated for arbitrary losses using reverse reconciliation protocols. This has recently also been experimentally demonstrated against restricted attacks [7] .
Up to recently, the security of continuous variable QKD protocols has only been analyzed in the asymptotic limit assuming an infinite number of communication rounds (see, e.g., [6, 8, 9] ). For protocols based on a Gaussian phase * furrer@eve.phys.s.u-tokyo.ac.jp and amplitude modulation this simplifies the security analysis tremendously. For instance, so-called collective attacks in which each signal is attacked independently and identically are as powerful as general (coherent) attacks [10] . Moreover, it has been shown that Gaussian collective attacks are optimal among all collective attacks [11, 12] . But these powerful results can no longer be applied if finite-size effects due to only a finite number of communication rounds are considered. And furthermore, even under a restricted set of collective Gaussian attacks a significantly lower key rate is obtained for feasible block lengths [13] .
A big challenge in continuous variable QKD is to prove security against coherent attacks including all finite-size effects. Since the Hilbert space of the system is infinite-dimensional certain techniques that are standard for discrete variable security proofs cannot be applied. For instance, the exponential quantum de-Finetti theorem [14] or the post-selection technique [15] that are used to lift security against collective attacks to security against coherent attacks do not directly apply in infinite dimensions (c.f. [10] ). Recently, the post-selection technique has been extended in order to apply it to continuous variable QKD [16] , but its practical implementation relies on a cumbersome symmetry step which is unpractical for real life applications.
Another promising approach has been presented in [17] which is based on a newly extended uncertainty relation including the effect of entangled observers [18, 19] . The corresponding protocol is based on the distribution of entangled two-mode squeezed states and homodyne detection implemented in [20] . The uncertainty relation allows to bound the information of an eavesdropper Eve solely by the correlation strength between the honest parties Alice and Bob. It has thus the advantage that no tomography, or equivalently, quantum channel estimations are necessary with the consequence of not relying on collective attacks. But in [17, 21] only losses up to 20% could be tolerated since a direct reconciliation protocol has been used. Moreover, the potential and limitations of the proof technique have not been fully investigated.
Here, we show that using a reverse reconciliation protocol significantly higher losses of over 50% can be tolerated enabling transmission distances of over 16 km including finitesize effects. This makes the protocol suitable for practical short distance continuous variable QKD providing security arXiv:1405.5965v3 [quant-ph] 18 Nov 2014 against coherent attacks. The security proof has the advantage that it does not require any assumptions on Alice's measurement device and is thus one-sided device independent.
Compared to [17] , the reverse reconciliation protocol requires Bob to apply a test to control the energy of the incoming signal. The test is based on a beam splitter to reflect a negligible part of the signal which is then measured with a heterodyne detector. We then show that conditioned that the outcomes of the heterodyne detector are sufficiently small the probability of Eve using a large energy attack can be neglected. This test further allows one to overcome the problem that homodyne detectors only operate faithfully in a limited detection range. Moreover, we provide a new statistical estimation procedure that enables us to deal with high energy signals which was not possible in [17] .
We also clarify the theoretical limitations of the proof technique based on the extended uncertainty relation. In particular, we provide the optimal key rate in the asymptotic limit of an infinite number of exchanged signals and without statistical uncertainty. Unfortunately, it turns out that even under these ideal conditions the tolerated losses are limited. An investigation of the asymptotic key rate for a broad range of continuous variable protocols based on the uncertainty relation has recently been given in [22] .
The paper is organized as follows. We start in Section II by introducing the security definitions and the classical part of the protocol. This enables us to give a general formula for the key rate presented in (4) . In Section III A, we discuss the experimental setup and how the raw key is formed. The different steps of the protocol are then listed in Section III B together with the assumptions. The main result is Theorem 1 which gives the explicit formula for the key length. In Section III C, we present plots of the key rates for experimentally feasible parameters. The security analysis is given in Section IV. The tightness of the security proof is analyzed in Section V. Eventually, we conclude our results in Section VI.
II. SECURITY OF A QKD PROTOCOL AND FINITE-KEY RATE A. Security Definitions
A generic QKD protocol consists of two phases. The first phase is given by the quantum part and includes the transmission and measurement of the quantum system. The second phase is purely classical and consists of the extraction of a secure key from the measured data by means of classical postprocessing. In the following, we consider an entanglement based scenario in which the source is trusted and located in Alice's laboratory. She then sends one part of the quantum system through a quantum channel to Bob. It is always understood that Alice's and Bob's laboratory's are closed, that is, no unwanted information can leak to an eavesdropper. Once all quantum systems are distributed, Alice and Bob perform measurements to obtain the data from which the raw keys X A and X B are formed. At the same time a parameter estimation test is done which concludes whether one proceeds with the key extraction or one aborts the protocol. Since the key generation is a statistical process, one can assign a probability p pass to the event that the parameter test is passed.
Given that the parameter estimation test is passed, Alice and Bob proceed with the classical post processing to generate the final keys S A and S B , respectively. Here, S A and S B are classical random variables which might be correlated with a quantum system E hold by an eavesdropper. We denote the associated classical-quantum state by ρ S A S B E . The state ρ S A S B E can conveniently be written as a classical quantum state We characterize a quantum key distribution protocol by its correctness and secrecy. For that we use a notion of security which is composable and based on the approach developed in [23] [24] [25] . A protocol is called c -correct if the probability that S A is not equal to S B is smaller than c :
Roughly speaking, a protocol is secret if the key S B is almost uniformly distributed and completely uncorrelated to Eve's system E. The ideal state is thus given by u S B ⊗ ρ E , where u S B denotes the uniform distribution over all keys and ρ E is the reduction of the state (1) to system E. We then say that a protocol is s -secret if
where · 1 denotes the trace norm and the infimum is taken over all possible states of Eve's system. Eventually, a protocol is called sec -secure if it is c -correct and s -secret with c + s ≤ sec . Note that the above security definition is composable in the sense that security is guaranteed if any part of the key is used for any other cryptographic protocol. This follows from the monotonicity of the trace distance.
B. Classical Post-Processing
As discussed in the previous section, the classical postprocessing transforms the raw keys X A and X B into the final keys S A and S B . In the first step of this post-processing an information reconciliation protocol is applied to diminish the discrepancy of X A and X B . It was shown in [6] that it is beneficial for continuous variable QKD protocols to use a reverse reconciliation scheme in which Alice corrects her raw key X A in order to match X B . This is especially crucial for long distance QKD. Throughout this paper, we assume that a one-way reverse reconciliation protocol is used in which IR bits of information about X B is sent to Alice via an authenticated classical channel. Given this information and X A , Alice outputs a guess X c A of X B .
In order to ensure correctness (2) for the raw keys X c A and X B (and thus for the keys), Bob applies a random function of a family of two-universal hash functions [26, 27] onto an alphabet of size 1/ c on X B . He then sends Alice over an authenticated public channel a description of the applied function together with the obtained value. This leaks additional log 1/ c bits of information, where the logarithm is always taken to base 2. Alice applies the function to her corrected raw key X c A and checks if the obtained value matches with the one from Bob. If this is the case, they proceed with the protocol otherwise they abort [28] . This then ensures that the generated key is c correct.
In a second step of the classical post-processing the raw key is hashed to a sufficiently small alphabet by means of a family of two-universal hash functions such that the key is sec -secure. Let us assume that the output of the hash functions is a bit string of length sec . For finite-dimensional E systems it has been shown in [29, 30] that the length of the bit string sec can be expressed by the smooth min-entropy H min (X B |E) which is related to the maximal probability that Eve guesses X B correctly (see Section IV A). This result has been extended in [31] to the case where Eve's system E is modeled by an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space, which is necessary for applications to continuous variable systems. In particular, it holds that if ≤ ( s − 1 )/(2p pass ),
is a tight lower bound on the key length sec with sec = c + s (see, e.g., [32] for details). The state ρ X B E for which the smooth min-entropy is evaluated corresponds to the classicalquantum state describing the joint state of Bob's raw key X B and Eve's system E conditioned that the protocol passes. The goal of the security analysis is to obtain a tight lower bound on (4) using the data collected in the parameter estimation step.
III. THE PROTOCOL AND KEY RATES

A. Experimental Setup and Generation of Data
The protocol is similar to the one in [17] and consists of the distribution of an entangled two-mode squeezed state and homodyne detection first proposed in [33] . But additionally, Bob performs a test in order to estimate whether the incoming signal exceeds a certain energy threshold. This test allows one to exclude high energy eavesdropping attacks and to restrict onto a bounded measurement range. This is crucial in order to do finite statistics with reliable error bounds. The test requires only two additional homodyne detectors.
The source is assumed to be in Alice's laboratory and generates a two-mode squeezed entangled state often referred to as an EPR state. This can be implemented by mixing two squeezed modes over a balanced beam splitter [34] . The important characteristic of a two-mode squeezed state is that there are two quadratures with a phase difference of π/2 for He mixes the incoming signal with a vacuum mode a using a beam splitter with very low reflectivity 1 − T and applies a heterodyne detection on the reflected signal a . The test then consists of checking whether the absolute value of the outcome of the amplitude measurement of mode t 1 and the phase measurement on twhich the two modes are highly correlated. We call these quadratures amplitude Q and phase P in the following. Alice then keeps one mode in her laboratory and performs at random an amplitude or phase measurement using a homodyne detector, where the probability for phase is 0 < r < 1. The other mode is sent through a fiber to Bob who is as well performing randomly an amplitude or phase measurement with probability 1 − r and r, respectively. Due to the property of a two-mode entangled state, Alice's and Bob's measurement outcomes are highly correlated if they both perform amplitude or phase measurement and uncorrelated otherwise.
Before Bob measures amplitude or phase of the incoming signal he performs an energy test. In particular, he mixes the signal with a vacuum mode a using a beam splitter with almost perfect transmittance T . The reflected signal a is measured via heterodyne detection, that is, mode a is mixed with another vacuum mode b by a balanced beam splitter and homodyne detection is performed to measure amplitude of one output q t 1 (mode t 1 ) and phase p t 2 of the other output (mode t 2 ). The setup is illustrated in Figure 1 . Bob then simply checks whether |q t 1 | and |p t 2 | is smaller than a prefixed value α for every incoming signal and aborts otherwise. In the following we denote the corresponding test by T (α, T ). In Section IV B, we show that conditioned that T (α, T ) passes the probability for large amplitude and phase measurements can be bounded.
While theoretically the spectrum of a homodyne measurement is the real line, any practical implementation is limited by a certain precision. We account for that by grouping outcomes into intervals of length δ, where δ should be larger than the precision of the homodyne detector. We then choose an M ≥ 0 smaller than the detector threshold and group the mea-surements into intervals
where we assume that 2M/δ is in N. We thus associate with any measurement result a value in X = {1, 2, ..., 2M/δ}.
It is important for the protocol to have high correlations between Alice's and Bob's outcome in the index set X . But due to losses in the fiber, Bob's amplitude and phase quadratures Q B and P B will be damped. In order to account for that, we scale the quadrature measurements of Alice's detector Q A and P A before grouping them into the intervals using the transformations
The scaling factors t q and t p ≤ 1 are adjusted according to the channel losses in the transmission of the mode to Bob. For the following, we also need a function to measure the strength of the correlations between two strings X, Y ∈ X N . For that we introduce the average distance
We further define the average second moment of the difference between the strings by
Moreover, we define average second moment for the discretized phase and amplitude measurements X ∈ X N by
Here, we subtract M/δ since in the absence of an eavesdropper the average value of X will be (approximately) M/δ such that m 2 (X) simplifies to the variance. This holds because the first moments of the amplitude and phase measurements in the absence of Eve are 0, which implies that the first moments of the discretized value will be approximately M/δ.
B. The Protocol
The protocol depends on the total number of prepared twomode squeezed states N tot , the probability that Alice and Bob perform a phase measurement r, the interval length for the data generation δ, the threshold parameters α and M (see Section III A), and a fixed value d 0 > 0 used in the parameter estimation test. All classical communication is assumed to be authenticated. The different steps in the protocol are as follows.
1. Distribution & Measurement: Alice prepares N tot twomode squeezed states and sends half of it to Bob upon which both measure for each mode phase with probability r and amplitude with probability (1 − r). Moreover, Bob applies the test T (α, T ), that is, he checks if |q t 1 |, |p t 2 | ≤ α is satisfied for all of the N tot incoming modes and aborts the protocol otherwise (see Figure 1 ). 
If this does not hold they abort the entire protocol. Otherwise, they proceed with the protocol and compute the second moment of the distance
according to (7) . Moreover, they individually compute the average second moments of all their phase measurements V
4. Classical Post-Processing They run a classical postprocessing protocol as described in Section II B by applying first a one-way reverse reconciliation protocol and secondly hash the corrected raw keys X c A and X B to final keys S A and S B of length .
The crucial point is now to obtain a tight bound on the possible number of secure bits one can generate by the above protocol. Such a bound relies always on a set of assumptions. Such assumptions can, for instance, be a restriction on the attacks of the eavesdropper or simplifications used to model the experimental setup. We thus start, with a detailed description of our assumptions before presenting the key length formula.
We always assume that Alice's and Bob's laboratory are secure and closed, that is, no unwanted information leaks from their laboratory. It is further very important to assume that all random numbers used for the basis choice and the classical post-processing are truly random and independent. This implies for instance that Alice's and Bob's basis choice are random and independent which is crucial for the security. While these assumptions are at the ground of most of the security analysis the following are specific for our measurement setup and security proof.
(A) Assumptions. We assume that Bob's sequential measurement of the values in X are independent and correspond to perfect amplitude and phase measurements of the intervals I k defined in Section III A. Hence, they can be modeled by integration of the spectrum of onemode amplitude and phase operators with perfect phase difference of π/2 [35] . The same applies to Bob's test measurement performed in T (α, T ).
We note that (A) includes the assumption that the local phase reference used by Bob is trusted. This can be practically justified by either monitoring the phase reference or generating it independently directly on Bob's side. For possible attacks on the local oscillator and countermeasures see, for instance, [5] . We emphasize that we do not make any assumptions on Eve's attacks and that there are no requirements on Alice's measurement device. The latter is sometimes referred to as one-sided device independent [36] .
As we will discuss in details in Section IV, security will be inferred from the uncertainty principle with quantum memory for continuous variable systems [19] . The principle says that Eve's information about the amplitude measurements is bounded by an overlap term of Bob's measurements expressed by
and the uncertainty of Alice about Bob's phase measurement. The latter can be estimated using the distance d 0 and the function
Moreover, we use the test T (α, T ) to upper bound the probability that Bob measures an amplitude or phase quadrature larger than M by (see equation (32))
where µ = 1−T 2T . Hence, the probability can be made sufficiently small by tuning the parameters α, T , and M . Using large deviation bounds for the statistical estimation of the raw key sample we then obtain the following bound on the key length. Theorem 1. Let us consider the above protocol with parameters (N tot , r, δ, M, α, d 0 ) and assume that the conditions in (A) are satisfied. We further assume that the reconciliation protocol broadcasts IR bits of classical information and the correctness test is passed for two-universal hash functions onto an alphabet of size 1/ c . Then, if the protocol passes, an ccorrect and s -secret key of length
can be extracted, where
with
Key Rate Since the source is assumed to be in Alice's laboratory her losses are set to ηA = 0. We set the excess noise ηex = 0.01, the security parameters to s = c = 10 −9 , and the test parameters to T = 0.99 and α = 28.
for the smallest ν for which
is positive and 1 − 2 1 − p n E < s . In the case that there is no ν such that ξ is positive or 1 − 2 2Γ(M, T, α) < s is not satisfied, the key length is 0.
The proof of the above theorem will be given in Section IV. Before that we present some estimates of the obtained key rates for experimentally feasible parameters.
C. Discussion of Key Rates
For the following, we consider a two-mode squeezed state with squeezing λ sq and antisqueezing λ asq given by
where and Z = diag(1, −1). The fiber losses of the channel are simulated by mixing the signal with vacuum at a beam splitter. We quantify the losses on Alice's and Bob's arm by η A and η B which specifies the reflectivity of the beam splitter, and thus, the amount of vacuum in the outgoing signal. We further include excess noise η ex modeled as a classical Gaussian noise channel acting on the variances of quadratures as V → V + η ex tV vac with t the transmittance of the channel and V vac the variance of the vacuum (see, e.g., [3, 37] ). This transforms the covariance matrix in (16) to whereη A = 1 − η A , similarη B and Γ vac denotes the covariance matrix of the one-mode vacuum.
In the protocol, the scaling factors for Alice's measurement t q and t p have to be adjusted. In an experiment, t p should be chosen such that the distance d PE is small. A convenient way for that is to determineQ A andP A such that the second moments of Alice's and Bob's (continuous) amplitude and phase measurements match. These values can be determined locally and communicated in the classical post-processing step.
The important parameter of the protocol that is directly related to the state is d 0 , which should be chosen such that with high probability the distance d PE computed for many samples of the Gaussian state given by the covariance matrix (17) is smaller than d 0 .
The leakage in the reconciliation protocol IR is set to [13] 
where H(X B ) denotes the Shannon entropy of X B , I(X A : X B ) the mutual information between X A and X B , and β the efficiency of the reconciliation protocol. The efficiency in the Shannon limit is β = 1, while β < 1 for any finite n.
It is now important that the protocol is robust, that is, it passes with high probability if no eavesdropper is presence. This means that the test T (α, T ) has to pass with high probability for the above two-mode squeezed state. The probability that T (α, T ) fails can be easily upper bounded by (see inequality (38) 
where σ t is the maximum of the standard deviations of the outcome distributions of q t 1 and p t 2 . Hence, by setting α = 2σ 2 t ln( √ 8πσ t N tot / T ) we ensure that the T (α, T ) fails with probability smaller than T . Depending on α and T , we then choose M such that 2 2nΓ(α, T, M ) = 2 is smaller than s .
We define the key rate as /N tot where is taken as in (12) and optimized over the probability r for choosing amplitude or phase. For that we simply express n, k, and m in terms of N tot and r. We further optimize the key rate over the spacing δ under the constraint 1 ≥ δ ≥ 0.01 to account for the resolution of the detector. The security parameters are chosen as s = c = 10 −9 . Moreover, we set T = 10 −9 , T = 0.99 and 2 = s /10 for which we find that α ≤ 28 and M ≤ 8000 in units of = 2 for relevant values of N tot and realistic squeezing strengths.
In Figure 2 and 3 we plotted the key rate against the total number of exchanged signals N tot for a reconciliation efficiency β = 0.95 and β = 0.9, respectively. The squeezing and antisqueezing is chosen as λ sq = 11 and λ asq = 16 which has experimentally been achieved in the laboratory [38] at 1550nm. Note that this squeezing values already include the efficiency of the homodyne detection. We further set the excess noise to η ex = 0.01 in the plots. We note that a reconciliation efficiency of about 0.9 is more realistic with current non-binary error correction codes. The maximal amount of losses to still obtain a secure key rate is slightly above 55% for β = 0.95 and 50% for β = 0.9. The key rate in dependence of the distance for different values of β is plotted in Figure 4 . For that we used a loss rate of 0.20 dB per km and additional coupling losses of 0.05. We see that for the same squeezing rates as above and an error correction efficiency of 0.95, a positive key rate can be obtained for over 16 km.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS A. Estimation of Eve's Information by the Uncertainty Principle with Quantum Memories
The first step of the security proof is the same as in [17] except that the roles of Alice and Bob are exchanged and that the basis choices for parameter estimation and key generation are different. We start with the definition of the min-and maxentropies.
Let X be a random variable over a countable set X distributed according to p x . Suppose further that X is correlated to a quantum system B associated with Hilbert space H B and corresponding state space S(H B ) = {ρ B | ρ B ≥ 0, tr ρ B = 1}. The min-entropy of a classical quantum state
is defined as the negative logarithm of the optimal success probability to guess X given access to the quantum memory B [39] . In formulas, this is
where the supremum is taken over all positive operator valued measures (POVM) {E x }, i.e., E x ≥ 0 and x E x = 1 I. A further entropy related to the min-entropy via the uncertainty relation is the max-entropy which is defined as
where the supremum runs over all states σ B ∈ S(H B ) and
2 denotes the fidelity. The corresponding smooth min-and max-entropy are then obtained by optimizing the min-and max-entropy over nearby states. The closeness of states is measured with the purified distance P(ρ, σ) = 1 − F (ρ, σ) [40] . We also allow for sub-normalized states defining the smooth min-and maxentropy as
where the supremum and infimum are taken over subnormalized states, i.e.,ρ XB ≥ 0 and trρ XB ≤ 1, with P(ρ XB ,ρ XB ) ≤ . Let us consider now the situation in the protocol. According to (4), we have to bound the smooth min-entropy of the state associated with the raw key of Bob X B and the system of Eve E. Suppose that ρ A n B n E denotes the state of the n modes on which the amplitude measurements for the raw key generation are performed conditioned on the event that the protocol passes. The state ρ X B E of X B and E can then be obtained by measuring the amplitudes of B n according to the discretization induced by the intervals {I k }. But since the intervals I 1 and I 2M/δ are of infinite length any uncertainty relation will get trivial for the associated measurements.
In order to avoid this problem, let us introduce phase and amplitude measurement with discretization {Ĩ k } k∈Z , wherẽ
We note thatĨ k = I k for k = 2, 3, ..., 2M/δ − 1. We denote byX B (Ỹ key B ) the classical random variable corresponding to Bob's discretized amplitude (phase) measurement outcome k ∈ Z. Moreover, the classical quantum state ofX B (Ỹ key B ) and A n E is denoted by ρX B A n E (ρỸ key B A n E ). As we will see below, the energy test assures that the purified distance between ρ X B E and ρX B E as well as ρ Y key B A n and ρỸ key B A n are small.
Let us assume for now that P(ρ X B E , ρX B E ) and P(ρ Y key B A n , ρỸ key B A n ) are smaller than˜ . We then find that
which is a simple consequence of the definition of smooth min-and max-entropy. The uncertainty relation in [31] then provides the inequality [41] 
where S
0 (·, x) is the 0th radial prolate spheroidal wave function of the first kind. In the regime of interest δ ≤ 1, c(δ) can be approximated as in (9) .
If we combine now the inequalities (24), (25) and (26), we obtain from the formula in (4) a lower bound on the key length given by
where
In the next section we use the energy test to give a bound on˜ .
B. Failure Probabiltiy of the Energy Test
The goal of this section is to give a bound on the purified distance of ρ X B E and ρX B E as well as ρ Y key B A n and ρỸ key B A n . It turns out that they can be bounded by the probability that the energy test is passed although an amplitude or phase larger than M is measured. We start with ρ X B E and ρX B E . In a first step we compute that
29) where {|q i | ≤ M } denotes the event that the absolute value of the continuous amplitude measurement of Bob's ith mode is smaller than M . This follows directly from the properties of the fidelity of a classical quantum state
where p k is the probability of measuring an amplitude in the intervalĨ k , ρ k E the corresponding conditional state of Eve, and q i , σ i E for i = 1, 2M/δ similar for amplitude measurements smaller than −M and larger than M , respectively. The inequality follows from
for any two non-normalized states ρ and σ. Note now that the last line of the above computation is nothing else than Pr[∧ i {|q i | ≤ M }|ρ A n B n E ] such that the bound (29) follows from the definition of the purified distance. We then denote the probability that Bob measures an amplitude larger than M conditioned that the protocol passes by
where the second inequality follows since ρ A n B n E is the state conditioned that the protocol passes. Using ¬ ∧ i {|q i | ≤ M } = ∨ i {|q i | > M } and Bayes theorem, we obtain by simple manipulations
where the last inequality holds since pass of the protocol implies that the energy test is passed which implies that |q t 1 i | ≤ α. We now bound each term individually by
where the supremum in the last line refers to the essential supremum.
We then show the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let us assume that the energy test T (α, T ) is
passed and set µ = 1−T 2T and λ = (
Proof. In the following, we suppress the index i since the argument applies independently to all possible incoming modes. We further label the different modes in the energy test setup as in Figure 1 . We are interested in computing Λ x = Pr[|q t 1 i | ≤ α| q i = x] and without loss of generality we can assume that x ≥ 0.
In order to compute Λ x , we write the characteristic function χ out of the output state of modes s , t 1 , and t 2 in terms of the characteristic function χ in of the input state of modes a, b, and s. Let B be the matrix describing the linear transformation of the coordinates of the phase space induced by the beam splitters, that is, r out = Br in , where r in = (q a , p a , q b , p b , q s , p s ) and r out = (q s , p s , q t 1 , p t 1 , q t 2 , p t 2 ). For the following it will be important that q s =
where χ * (q) = dpχ * (q, p) andÃ is determined by the condition
In order to condition on q s = x, we set χ
) where δ denotes the Dirac delta distribution and we used that q s =
Here, we obtained A fromÃ by setting q s = 1/T x+ (1 − T )/T q a and removing the absolute value. In order to bound the integral in (35), we split the area A into A 1 = A ∩ {q a ≥ 0} and A 2 = A\A 1 . If we set l(q b ) = max{0, 1/d 1 (µx−α−d 2 q b )}, we get that the integration over A 1 amounts to
where the inequality follows from
for l ≥ 0. A straightforward calculation of (37) gives
In order to compute the integral over A 2 , we note first that
Using that u(q a ) ≤ 0 for all q a ≤ 0, we can apply again (38) to bound
where we also extended the integration over q a to run over the whole real line. Finally, the same calculation as before shows that (41) is given by
We can thus conclude that Λ x is bounded by the sum of (39) and (42) . Finally, the supremum over x is attained for x = M which completes the proof.
By means of Lemma 1, we can now bound p fail ≤ nΓ(M, T, α)/p pass . Using the relation in (29) together with (1 − p fail ) 2 ≥ 1 − 2p fail , we finally arrive at
Let us now consider the case of ρ Y key B A n and ρỸ key B A n . It is easy to see that the same strategy can be applied as in the previous situation. This is simply based on the fact that |p t 2 | ≤ α if the test T (α, M ) is passed. Hence, following the exactly same steps for the phase measurements as before for amplitude, we find that also
holds.
Summarizing the above arguments, we have thus shown that (28) is a lower bound on the key rate if we set
C. Statistical Estimation of the Max-Entropy
The goal of this section is to use the information from the parameter estimation step to upper bound the smooth maxentropy H max (Y key B |A n ) ω . In a first step, we apply Alice's scaled and discretized phase measurement to A n mapping it to a classical outcome Y key A also in X n . Using now that the smooth max-entropy can only increase under processing of the side-information [31, 40] , we obtain that
We next note that it has been shown in [17] that if X and Y are random variables on X n × X n distributed according to
2 holds, it follows that
with γ as defined in (10) . In order to apply this result to bound H max (Y For that we use a large deviation bound and estimate the probability
. But since the alphabet size scales with M and is thus very large, a direct application of a large deviation bound would result in a large failure probability. This can be avoided by employing a strategy that splits the problem into two estimation steps.
In the first step, we bound in Lemma 2 the probability that
+ ν. This will be done using Serfling's large deviation bound [42] . Given that m 2 (Y 
where we used that
Applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we can then bound
Hence, given that m 2 (Y key
2 holds, we find that σ ≤ σ * with σ * as defined in (14) .
In the second step, we bound in Lemma 3 the probability that
is larger than d PE + µ for a fixed and bounded σ. Combining these two steps, we can then estimate
where C denotes the condition m 2 (Y 
Proof. The proof is similar to strategies applied in [17, 43] and based on a large deviation bound for random sampling without replacement by Serfling [42] . Denoting the population mean of the variance by
The large deviation bound in [42] implies that
Since the bound is independent of V Y , it is not necessary to know the actual value of V Y . Indeed, using the relation in (51), we obtain the desired bound 
Proof. The bound follows directly from Bernstein's inequality
which, as shown by Hoeffding [44] , also holds for sampling without replacement. Using that nd key + kd PE = N d tot and that |X | = 2M/δ, a straigthforward calculation results in (53).
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1. For that we observe that from (47) follows that
if µ is such that (49) is smaller than 2 . Hence, we use Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 to bound (49) and set the expression equal to 2 , where ≤ ( 1 − s )/(2p pass ) − 2˜ with˜ as in (45) (c.f. (28)). Solving the equation for µ and using p pass ≤ 1, we obtain an upper bound on µ by (13) . This concludes the security proof.
V. PERFORMANCE AND LIMITATIONS OF SECURITY PROOFS BASED ON THE EXTENDED UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE
In Section IV A, we have seen that the main ingredient in the security proof is the uncertainty relation with quantum memory for smooth min-and max-entropy (c.f. (26))
Here, we denote by Q δ,n B and P δ,n B the classical random variable induced by an arbitrary amplitude and phase measurement with discretization into intervals of equal length δ. Thus, the tightness of the bound on the optimal key rate (4) crucially depends on how tight the uncertainty relation is for the state given in the protocol. Since we are interested in optimality in the following, and as such in the question of how much key can be extracted under normal working condition, we can assume that Eve is absent for the moment. Then, the state is in good approximation given by the n-fold tensor product of identical Gaussian states described by a covariance matrix depending on coupling and channel losses as well as excess noise as described in (17) .
But even though we can assume that the state takes this simple form it is still very hard to compute the corresponding smooth min-and max-entropy directly. We circumvent this problem by using a further approximation. In particular, we can use the asymptotic equipartition property in infinite dimensions [45] , saying that the smooth min-entropy Furthermore, if we choose δ small enough we can approximate the von Neumann entropy of the discrete distribution over intervals of length δ by the differential von Neumann entropy [19] 
where h(Q B |E) denotes the differential quantum conditional entropy of the continuous amplitude measurement. Similarly, we have that
, we can thus conclude that in the asymptotic limit inequality (56) is well approximated by
Hence, we can qualitatively investigate the tightness of (56) by considering inequality (58). For our situation, the latter one can now easily be analyzed as the differential quantum conditional entropy can be computed for Gaussian classical and quantum states. In the following, we always choose system E as the Gaussian purification of the Gaussian state between A and B. In [19] , it was shown that (58) gets approximately tight for a two-mode squeezed state without losses and squeezing above 10 dB. However, tightness holds only conditioned on Alice's quantum system but not after she performs the amplitude measurements. The data processing inequality only ensures that
but equality does not always hold, even for the optimal measurement on A. Unfortunately, in our case it turns out that the loss through the data processing inequality is substantial (see Figure 5 ) such that the optimality of the bound has to be analyzed for the inequality after applying the data processing inequality h(Q B |E) + h(P B |P A ) ≥ log 2π .
In Figure 5 , we plotted the tightness of (58) and (60) for the same parameters of the state for which the key rates are plotted in Section III C. We see that unfortunately, the gap between the left hand side and right hand side of (58) and (60) increases for high losses. We further note that an increase of the initial squeezing does hardly change the gap for losses above 30%. This gap severely limits the tolerated noises also causing that the finite-key rates presented in Section III C vanish for high losses. We can quantitatively analyze the effect of the untightness of the uncertainty relation on the key rate by calculating the asymptotic key rate (4) . In this regime all the statistical estimation errors disappear and collective attacks are as strong as coherent attacks [10] . We find for the asymptotic key rate by using that IR = H(P δ B |P δ A ) for perfect error correction and (57) the simple formula r UR = log 2π − 2h(P B |P A ) .
In contrast, the asymptotically optimal key rate given by the Devetak-Winter formula [46] is r Opt = h(P B |E) − h(P B |P A ) ,
where we also applied the approximation in (57). In Figure 6 , we compare the finite-key rate from (12) with the asymptotic (straight line) is compared with the asymptotic key rate rUR (dashed), the optimal key rate rOpt (dashed-dotted), and the asymptotic key rate for direct reconciliation rDR (dotted). The squeezing and antisqueezing is set to 11dB and 16dB and Alice's coupling losses as well as the excess noise to 0. The reconciliation efficiency of the non-asymptotic key rate is β = 0.95 and the other parameters are as in Figure 2 .
key rates r UR and r Opt for the same parameters as in Figure 2 except that the excess noise is set equal to 0. We see that even the asymptotic key rate r UR vanishes for moderate losses of 66%. We remark that even if the squeezing is arbitrarily high and the losses in Alice's mode are 0% the maximally tolerated losses are not exceeding 75%.
In Figure 6 , we also plotted the asymptotic key rate obtained via the extended uncertainty principle if using a direct reconciliation protocol. In this situation the asymptotic key rate is r DR = log 2π − 2h(P A |P B ). The plot shows that we have obtained a finite-key rate in the case of reverse reconciliation for losses much larger than what is ultimately tolerated in the case of direct reconciliation.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented a security proof against coherent attacks including finite-size effects for a reverse reconciliation continuous variable QKD protocol. The protocol is based on the generation of two-mode squeezed states and homodyne detection. Security for transmission losses of up to 50% for experimental parameters demonstrated in [38] have been certified under realistic assumptions. A remaining challenging point in an implementation of the presented protocol will be the reconciliation protocol. However, recently some advances have been made in non-binary error correction codes such that reconciliation efficiencies above 90% seem realistic.
We further investigated on the tightness of the security analysis based on the uncertainty relation with quantum memory and showed that even in the asymptotic limit the maximally tolerated losses are bounded. The reason for that is that the uncertainty relation is not perfectly tight and for high losses the trade-off between Eve's knowledge and the correlations between Bob and Alice gets very small. Hence, for the high loss regime a very tight bound on Eve's information is crucial.
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